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Legal Aspects of Local Planning and
Zoning in Louisiana
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM*
This is a crucial period in the life of city planning and zon-
ing in America. Despite the critical need for new homes and the
construction requirements of the industrial and commercial com-
munity, it is of the highest importance that there be no break-
down in our planning and zoning standards. The situation
actually demands the strengthening and more effective use of
such controls. A tremendous amount of building will be in
progress for a period of years. If it turns into a haphazard,
mushrooming process the objectives of health, beauty, con-
venience and stable economic values will suffer immeasurably.
What is involved, then, is much more than meeting the pressing
current need of housing. At stake are the very shape and char-
acter of our cities, towns and villages for the indefinite future.
The physical focus of the problem is the suburban area. There
is nothing more artificial than municipal corporate limits. It is a
commonplace that urban population trends are strongly outward
from the heart of a given community toward the suburban
periphery. This means that effective planning and zoning must
comprehend the suburbs. The capital city, Baton Rouge, epito-
mizes the matter. The Baton Rouge metropolitan district em-
braces a total area and an aggregate population far more than
double those of the city proper. The city, however, may zone
only its own territory.' The parish is not endowed with zoning
authority and the only available parish legal controls are the
powers of the police jury to govern the location and construction
of public improvements and to regulate the laying out of sub-
divisions.2
It is quite in order, then, to re-examine the legal basis for
community planning and zoning in Louisiana. An adequate in-
quiry into the subject would deal as well with the administrative
materials. It is proposed to pursue that branch of the study more
* Professor of Public Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. La. Act 240 of 1926, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5789].
2. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2743, as amended by La. Act 234 of 1928
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6405].
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at leisure and to treat of it in a subsequent issue of this REVIEW.
At the moment, I have an eye to the fact that the legislature is
due to meet in May. What statutory changes are needed to place
the local units of government in a position to do a good plan-
ning and zoning job? Let us take an inventory.
PLANNING
The position of primacy in the legal control of community
development is occupied by planning. Careful planning is a
nne qua non of intelligent zoning. Louisiana's planning legisla-
tion is spotty and does not give full recognition to this funda-
mental. At the state level there is effective provision for plan-
ning as a function of the Department of Public WorksA The
enabling statute contemplates assistance to and cooperation with
local planning agencies. This includes investigation of particu-
lar local planning problems. In addition to existing federal aids to
local planners, the pending Wagner-Ellender Housing Bill au-
thorizes an appropriation of $12,500,000 for studies and reports on
various factors affecting housing, including zoning regulations,
and a further appropriation of $25,000,000 for grants to local
public bodies on a fifty-fifty basis to aid in financing local studies,
plans and surveys relating to housing and other community de-
velopment.4 But, quite apart from these external aids, the legal
position of local planning agencies should be bolstered.
The general city planning enabling act applies only to
"cities," whereas zoning power has been granted to all munici-
palities.5 The act does not define "cities." They are defined in the
general municipal charter law, the so-called Lawrason Act, as
municipalities with five thousand or more inhabitants. The stat-
ute refers to the "commission council" as the city governing body,
whereas cities operating under the Lawrason Act have the mayor
and board of aldermen form of government. Provision is made
for an unwieldly planning commission of fifteen members, who
S. A state planning commission was created by La. Act 38 of 1936 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 9664.1 et seq.]. By La. Act 2 of 1942, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (Supp.
1944) § 6753.3] the commission was "merged and consolidated" into the
newly created department of public works.
4. S. 1592, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. (1946) Title II.
5. La. Act 305 of 1926, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5768]. While the title
of the act refers to "municipalities," the purview applies only to "cities."
The commission-manager form of government law authorizes the creation
of a "city plan board" with such duties and powers as shall be prescribed
by ordinance. La. Act 160 of 1918, § 54 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5559]. It is
no credit to Louisiana that of the more than 600 city manager cities in the
United States not one is a Louisiana municipality.
6. La. Act 136 of 1898, § 1, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5408].
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must be "freeholders.' 7 A much smaller body would doubtless
be better mobilized and more effective. The common law term
"freeholder" was an obvious inadvertence; it was clearly intended
to refer to a property owner. Why, however, have a property
qualification? This is not 1832 or before. The ablest, sanest and
most interested student of community development may very
well not be a landowner.8
The act is silent as to the organization and procedure of the
commission. Nothing is said about a chairman, vice-chairman,
secretary or other officers and employees. The methods of con-
ducting business and making and preserving records are likewise
left to conjecture or improvisation.
The statute is entirely inadequate in its treatment of the
powers and duties of a planning commission. It does not require
the preparation of a master plan. Community planning which
is not projected on a scale which embraces an over-all pattern is
almost as objectionable as piecemeal zoning.9 The task must be
seen in the large if intelligent integration is to be achieved. Nor
is provision made for the adoption of an official map showing the
layout of streets, parks and other public ways or places. 10 No
mention is made of such important ancillary powers as the au-
thority to enter upon private property for the purpose of making
examinations and surveys.1
The act requires submission of plats, plans and allotments or
subdivisions, laid out into lots or plats with streets or other ways
intended to be dedicated to public use, to the city planning com-
mission prior to being received for record "unless accepted by
the legislative body of the municipality." This is little more than
an empty gesture. Commission approval has no vitality because
the governing body may ignore it. Even where the latter exer-
cised restraint the commission would be in a weak position since
7. Supra note 5. Members of such a board are appointed for ten year
terms on a staggered basis. This is a very extended period. A compact
body of five members with terms so staggered that there would be one new
member each year is suggested as a desirable pattern.
8. Even if proprietorship of land were once a valid qualification for pub-
lic office, it would be sadly antiquated in this day of landholding and develop-
ment through the corporate device. See Berle and Means, The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property (1933) c. I.
9. See text above note 46 infra.
10. It seems desirable, moreover, to regulate expressly the subject of
building in mapped streets. It may be done by appropriate provision in a
planning enabling act or by separate enactment. See Bassett, Williams,
Bettman and Whitten, Model Laws for Planning Cities, Counties and States
(Harvard City Planning Studies VII-1935) 43, 89.
11. The state planning act, on the other hand, confers this authority upon
the state planning agency. La. Act 38 of 1938, § 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 9664.6].
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the law does not articulate guiding standards nor authorize the
commission to adopt regulations or impose conditions. Procedure
is ignored; there is no provision for public hearings or judicial
review.
Perhaps enough has been said to suggest the desirability of
a new and adequate municipal planning enabling act. Ample
comparative materials are available to the draftsman. 2
What is the situation at the parish level? The problem of
the suburb presses for attention; it bespeaks an approach geared
to the factual unity of intra-municipal and suburban areas. The
police juries were granted a measure of planning authority in
1928. 33 The statute does not provide for any separate planning
agency or other administrative machinery but it does empower
a police jury to legislate broadly with respect both to the laying
out and modification of streets, parks and other public improve-
ments and to the private platting and subdividing of land. It is
to be observed that the city planning law authorizes a planning
commission to prepare maps and plans as to land outside the
municipality and to make recommendations concerning the de-
velopment of such land. The 1928 law relating to parishes ex-
pressly saves, unaffected by the act, any power or authority then
vested by law in a municipal governing authority. The diffi-
culty is that a planning commission is not a governing authority,
nor does it derive its authority from such a body. This reasoning
is academic at best, however, since a city planning commission's
work has no binding legal effect, in any event.
The Local Services Act of 1942 empowers any one or more
parishes and any one or more municipalities to engage jointly
in the "exercise of any power, the making of any improvement,
or the promotion and maintenance of any undertaking" which
each is empowered by law to exercise or undertake separately.14
That act contemplates that joint action be undertaken by
written agreement and authorizes the creation of a joint agency
12. The draftsman has but to resort to the ample comparative statutory
materials to find no end of suggestive provisions. For model statutes see
Model City Charter (National Municipal League, 5 ed. 1941) § 125 et seq.;
Bassett, Williams, Bettman and Whitten, op. cit. supra note 10, at 39, 76.
13. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2743, as amended by La. Act 234 of 1928, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6405]. In American Ice Company v. Police Jury,
Parish of Jefferson, 162 La. 614, 617, 110 So. 878, 879 (1926), the supreme
court declared invalid, as ultra vires, a parish ordinance, which prohibited
the erection and maintenance of establishments using coal, oil, electricity
or any other motor power for the operation of a business, without first se-
curing a permit from the police jury. The court remarked: "So far as we
know, the only laws applicable to zoning apply to municipalities, and not to
police juries."
14. La. Act 246 of 1942, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 6283.4].
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to administer the terms of the agreement. The statute is lit-
erally broad enough to embrace joint parish-municipal action
with respect to control of private platting and subdividing in
suburban areas. Something more is needed. As will already
have appeared, such action, unassociated with a comprehensive,
unified plan, would be little more than uncorrelated patchwork.
It is my conclusion that the legislature should enact broad
parish planning enabling legislation, designed to encourage co-
operation between parish and city planning agencies.1 5
Slum Clearance
The worst blighted areas in southern cities are, of course, the
negro residence districts. The problems they generate are more
acute than those of the suburban areas but are not so pressing
on the conventional city planning and zoning level. The objec-
tive, in dealing with such areas, is not private development of
private property, implemented by effective legal controls and
well-integrated public improvements. Rather, it is slum clear-
ance and rehabilitation based on a frank recognition of the fact
that the citizens and residents concerned are, in economic fact,
unable to correct the situation without positive governmental
assistance.
Thus far we have barely scratched the surface in this most
difficult area of community development. In 1924 the legislature
enacted a race segregation measure, which was intended to get
around the constitutional barrier to segregation legislation raised
by the United States Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley 8
The act forbade any white person to establish his residence in a
negro community and any negro to establish his residence in a
white community except with the written consent of a majority
of the persons of the other race residing in the community.1" A
New Orleans ordinance, adopted pursuant to this and an earlier
statute,'8 was upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court, as applied
to the proposed use of a house in a white community to quarter
negro tenants. 9 That court proceeded upon the theory that the
15. Distinctly rural planning is a separate problem. See, for example,
Wis. Stats. (1943) 27.015 and Wertheimer, Constitutionality of Rural Zoning
(1938) 26 Calif. L. Rev. 175.
16. 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917).
17. La. Act 118 of 1924, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5814]. The act was
applicable only to municipalities with populations exceeding 25,000 persons.
It defined "community" to include every residence fronting on either side
of any street within 300 feet from the location of the property involved.
18. La. Act 117 of 1912, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5811].
19. Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925); 160 La. 943, 107
So. 704 (1926).
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ordinance was, in substance, a non-discriminatory zoning meas-
ure within the legitimate sweep of the police power. The trans-
parent consent mechanism was deemed enough to negative dis-
crimination and distinguish the case from Buchanan v. Warley.
The Supreme Court of the United States, on writ of error, con-
sidered the judgment below so patently wrong that it, by a per
curiam decision, without opinion, reversed the judgment and con-
tented itself with merely citing Buchanan v. Warley.
Race segregation measures, even if constitutional, would
have no constructive value in meeting the real problem. Instead,
they would impede the economically capable negro in doing
something for himself.
Some progress has been made in New Orleans and Shreve-
port through the construction of low cost public housing projects
with Federal Public Housing Authority assistance. By the ex-
press terms of the Housing Authorities Law, all housing projects
of an authority are subject to the planning, zoning, sanitary and
building laws, ordinances and regulations applicable to the
locality.21 In aid of housing projects, however, municipalities and
parishes are authorized by the Housing Cooperation Law to plan
or replan, zone or rezone any parts of their territories and munic-
ipalities to change their maps.2 2 Thus, there is a sufficient grant
of statutory authority to fit FPHA housing into the conventional
planning and zoning pattern.
The next step is to include slum clearance and blighted area
rehabilitation in the grant of planning authority and to empower
municipalities to execute the pertinent plans which are devel-
oped.2  This is, admittedly, a big step for Louisiana but the need
is great and the time most opportune. Certainly, American" in-
20. Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 47 S.Ct. 471, 71 L. Ed. 831 (1927). See
also Land Development Co. of Louisiana, Limited v. City of New Orleans,
164 La. 72, 113 So. 768 (1927).
Private exclusion of negroes can legally be effected by restriction in acts
of sale. Queensboro Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1914).
21. La. Act 275 of 1936, § 12 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6280.121.
22. La. Act 277 of 1938, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6280.32 (d)].
23. Section 143 of the Model City Charter (National Municipal League,
5 ed. 1941) grants the power in broad terms as follows:
"The council may adopt, modify and carry out plans proposed by the
planning commission for clearance of slum districts and rehabilitation of
blighted areas within the city and, for the accomplishment of this purpose,
may acquire by purchase or condemnation all privately owned land, build-
ings, and other real property interests within the district; may establish,
locate, relocate, build and improve the streets and other public open spaces
provided for in the plan; may maintain, operate, lease, or sell said buildings
or any of them; may sell the land, or any part thereof, designated for build-
* ings and private open spaces upon such terms and conditions and subject
to such restrictions as to building uses and open spaces as will substan-
tially carry out and effect the plan."
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dustry is capable of producing cheap, mass-production, prefabri-
cated housing, multiple and single. Such structures may prove
to be the key to rehabilitation in sub-marginal residential areas
inhabited by people in the lowest income groups.
Slum clearance has been recognized as a public purpose in
the housing cases.2 4 There can be no serious doubt that a broad
grant of authority to municipalities to prosecute slum clearance
and blighted area rehabilitation would stand up as a constitu-
tional matter.2 5
ZONING
Background
Prior to the enactment of any zoning enabling legislation in
the state, the City of New Orleans experimented with piecemeal
zoning grounded upon the broad charter powers of the city.2'5
The commission council enacted ordinances designed to set apart
certain streets as exclusively residential zones. A tenant, who
was operating a grocery in the affected zone, successfully chal-
lenged one ordinance. 27 A second ordinance succumbed to the
attack of a property owner who desired a permit to construct a
building to house a private market.28 The court proceeded on
the theory that the purpose was strictly esthetic, which over-
reached the police power and, thus, merited the stigma "ultra
vires, unreasonable, and invalid." The second case was decided
in 1917. The following year the general assembly enacted a brief
measure, which authorized cities having populations in excess of
fifty thousand, "to define and regulate the kind, style and man-
ner of construction of buildings and other edifices which may be
erected on certain designated streets and thoroughfares and to
permit or prohibit the establishment and operation of businesses
and trades within designated limits. ' '2 9
24. The test case In Louisiana was State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing
Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938). A very recent
case of accord is Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 IMl. 114, 59 N.E. (2d) 18 (1945).
25. The United States Supreme Court, in a cryptic opinion, recently
upheld the exertion by the federal government, through the Federal Public
Housing Authority, of power to acquire property for and to establish low-
cost housing projects. City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 65
S.Ct. 280 (1945). See generally Ebenstein, The Law of Public Housing
(1940) passim.
26. The city charter conferred upon the city all powers which by or
pursuant to the constitution could be granted to or exercised by any city.
La. Act 159 of 1912, § 1(e) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6175 (d)].
27. Calvo v. City of New Orleans, 136 La. 480, 67 So. 338 (1915).
28. State ex rel. Blaise v. City of New Orleans, 142 La. 73, 76 So. 244
(1917).
29. La. Act 27 of 1918, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5766].
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It was not until 1923 that the constitutionality of the 1918
act was presented for judicial determination. In the meantime
the state had adopted a new constitution, which contained the
following zoning enabling provision:
"All municipalities are authorized to zone their territory;
to create residential, commercial and industrial districts, and
to prohibit the establishment of places of business in residen-
tial districts.''30
Doubtless, as Chief Justice O'Niell early pointed out, the provi-
sion was intended to put at rest any question about municipal
authority to zone." The chief justice added, however, the senten-
tious observation that the section was unnecessary. State gov-
ernments are governments of residual, plenary authority. Thus,
a state legislature possesses all legislative power not denied to
it by the federal or state constitution or by limitations implicit in
our federal system.2 Fortunately, the court embraced the view
that the express grant in the constitution was mere supereroga-
tion.13 Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that such constitu-
tional drafting is fraught with hazards. On its face, the instant
section is self-executing; it grants authority directly to all munic-
ipalities. It is not surprising that the general zoning enabling act
of 1926 was attacked on the ground that the legislature may not
place limitations on the exertion of zoning authority or regulate
the manner of its exercise.3' The constitutional grant, moreover,
refers simply to intra-municipal territory. Is the rule of exclu-
sion to be invoked to make of the provision a denial of authority
to zone extracorporate areas?"
In 1944 the same conception of constitutional theory was em-
ployed to add an express authorization for parish and municipal
airport zoning.30
30. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 29.
31. State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 277, 97 So.
440, 442 (1923).
32. The court recently had occasion to reaffirm this elementary prin-
ciple of American constitutional law. Perot v. Police Jury of Natchitoches
Parish, 208 La. 1, 22 So. (2d) 666, 668 (1945).
33. State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 277, 97 So.
440, 442 (1923).
34. State ex rel. Holcombe v. City of Lake Charles, 175 La. 803, 144 So.
502 (1932).
35. It is to be hoped that such would not be the case. The question is
a rational one. A famous application of the rule is to be found in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). There it was applied to the clause
in the Federal Constitution (Art. III, § 2) pertaining to the original juris-
diction of the supreme court.
36. This was done by an amendment to La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 29,
which was initiated by La. Act 321 of 1944 and adopted by the electorate on
[Vol. VI
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The constitutionality of the 1918 enabling law came up for
determination in 1923. The supreme court upheld certain piece-
meal zoning ordinances of New Orleans, which had been
adopted pursuant to that act and which were attacked in six
separate suits by persons who desired to conduct retail or manu-
facturing businesses in the residence zones.31  The adverse deci-
sions, which had been rendered prior to 1918, were expressly
overruled to the extent that they involved holdings that munici-
pal ordinances proscribing business establishments in residence
districts were essentially esthetic measures not sustainable upon
ordinary police power considerations. By 1923 the courts of quite
a number of states had upheld zoning and the Louisiana court
duly noted the trend. In support of its favorable decision the
court marshalled the customary arguments about the advantages
of exclusive residence zones from the standpoint of police and
fire protection and general health and wellbeing. Objections
rested upon the due process and equal protection of the laws
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were rejected; the ordi-
nances affected alike all persons similarly situated.
In 1928 the court upheld a setback ordinance as a valid exer-
cise of the police power.38 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed, in a per curiam opinion,"9 on the authority of such then
recent cases as the Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company40
and Gorieb v. Fox.4 1
General Enabling Legislation
In 1926 the legislature enacted a comprehensive municipal
zoning enabling law.4" The act took effect only a few months
November 7, 1944. The enabling statute, La. Act 118 of 1944, was confirmed
by this amendment.
37. State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440
(1923); State ex rel. Dubos v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 287, 97 So. 445
(1923); State ex rel. Liberty Oil Co., Limited v. City of New Orleans, 154 La.
288, 97 So. 446 (1923); State ex rel Traverse v. City of New Orleans, 154 La.
289, 97 So. 446 (1923); State ex rel. Hayes v. City of New Orleans, 154 La.
289, 97 So. 446 (1923); Boland v. Compagno, 154 La. 469, 97 So. 661 (1923).
Zoning ordinances were upheld in State ex rel. Roberts v. City of New
Orleans, 162 La. 202, 110 So. 201 (1926); State ex rel. Palma v. City of New
Orleans, 161 La. 1103, 109 So. 916 (1926); and State ex rel. Giangrosso v. City
of New Orleans, 159 La. 1016, 106 So. 549 (1925).
38. Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 117 So. 827 (1928).
39. Sampere v. New Orleans, 279 U.S. 812, 49 S.Ct. 262, 73 L.Ed. 971 (1929).
40. 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
41. 274 U.S. 603, 47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L. Ed. 1228 (1927).
42. La. Act 240 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5788 et seq.]. At the same
session the legislature enacted a building line enabling measure. La. Act
339 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5772 et seq.]. The title and first section
of this act are referable solely to municipalities having populations in excess
of 50,000 persons as of the last preceding federal census. The enabling pro-
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before the Supreme Court of the United States, in Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Company,43 upheld comprehensive zoning
against attacks under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The model after which
the Louisiana act was patterned was the Standard Zoning Act,
sponsored by the Department of Commerce under the aegis of
Secretary Hoover. Except for airport zoning, the parishes have
not been granted zoning authority.44
While the 1926 enabling act is confined to comprehensive
zoning, it. expressly saves the 1918 piecemeal zoning law and as-
sumes the label "supplementary" legislation.4 5  Only two cities,
New Orleans and Shreveport, are affected by the earlier law and
both have comprehensive zoning ordinances; but it is not amiss
to observe, in passing, that piecemeal zoning is ill-conceived. The
occasion derives substance from the fact that Baton Rouge's ex-
isting zoning is nothing more than the setting apart of scattered
residential zones.46 Piecemeal zoning is superficial. It has little
perspective and scant relation to community planning since it is
but a random singling out of areas unassociated with any studied
and coherent over-all plan covering both private property and
integrated public improvements. The 1918 law should, therefore,
be repealed.
A comprehensive zoning ordinance has the effect of abrogat-
ing all prior piecemeal zoning regulations even though it does
not purport, in terms, to repeal them. On June 1, 1929, the gov-
erning body of the City of New Orleans adopted what was termed
and intended as a comprehensive zoning ordinance. That ordi-
nance prohibited mortuary establishments in certain districts
except upon the express permission of the governing body. This
provision was held unconstitutional in Bultman Mortuary Serv-
visions of Section 2, however, apply to municipalities of over 5,000 inhab-
itants.
43. 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
44. See note 13, supra. Airport zoning by parishes is authorized by La.
Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 29, as amended in 1944, and by La. Act 118 of
1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 27.40 et seq.]. See note 36, supra.
45. La. Act 240 of 1926, § 12 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5799]. The pertinent
compiler's notes in Dart's Statutes are a bit contradictory. Under Section
5766, which is Section 1 of Act 27 of 1918, it is stated that the act was
probably partially, if not entirely, superseded by Act 240 of 1926. But under
Section 5799, which is Section 12 of Act 240 of 1926, it is said that the act by
express provision does not limit or repeal the powers granted by the 1918
act. The latter statement is, of course, the correct one. Collett v. City of
Shreveport, 168 So. 346 (La. App. 1936). And see State ex rel. Chachere v.
Booth, 196 La. 598, 603, 199 So. 654, 656 (1941).
46. The Commission Council, on March 11, 1941, adopted a series of brief
zoning ordinances creating certain "strictly residential" districts.
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ice, Incorporated v. City of New Orleans,"7 for reasons herein-
after stated. With that unconstitutional provision out of the
way, the supreme court found that the ordinance, in effect, per-
mitted a mortuary establishment in a certain district. The court
proceeded to hold that a prior prohibitive ordinance was re-
pealed by implication, both because of conflict with the compre-
hensive zoning ordinance sans the offending provision and be-
cause the comprehensive zoning ordinance covered the whole
subject matter of zoning and thus left no room for the operation
of any earlier ordinance on the subject.
The 1926 law is a broad, general measure, designed to oc-
cupy the field exclusively, save for the 1918 act. Thus, it re-
peals by implication pre-existing inconsistent provisions of special
charters.4 8
It should be observed at once that the zoning authority
granted by the act is power to adopt zoning regulations "in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan." There is no authority for
piecemeal or "shotgun" zoning, not predicated upon a compre-
hensive plan. It is believed that some of our municipalities are
not clear on this point.
With respect to territorial scope comprehensive zoning stops
at the corporate limits. 49  The rapidly developing suburbs are
untouched. There are several legal ways of bridging the gap.
(1) The legislature might, by a special law, grant a municipality
of 2500 inhabitants or over a new charter or enact an amendment
to the old, which would so redefine municipal boundaries as to
include suburban areas. ° (2) Such areas might be annexed
under authority of the general annexation law.51 Annexation is
effected by ordinance but, as a prerequisite, the governing body
must have received the written assent of the owners of twenty-
five per centum in assessed value of the property in an area to
be annexed as determined by the assessment for the previous
calendar year as well as twenty-five per centum in number of
the property taxpayers in that area. (3) Zoning authority might
47. 174 La. 360, 140 So. 503 (1932).
48. State ex rel. Chachere v. Booth, 196 La. 598, 199 So. 654 (1941).
49. Airport zoning is an exception. See La. Act 118 of 1944, § 5 (3)
[Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 27.44 (3)].
50. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 3, proscribes local and special legisla-
tion as to municipal corporations of less than 2500 inhabitants, but not as to
those whose populations are 2500 or more.
51. La. Act 35 of 1924 as amended by Act 149 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939)§ 5370]. La. Act 154 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 5370] was designed
as a revision of this law. It was garbled in the legislature, however, and is
probably completely abortive.
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be conferred upon the parishes by general enabling legislation.52
While legislative tinkering with municipal government by spe-
cial legislation is not commended as good policy, it might be
warranted in special instances where metropolitan problems,
such as those of Baton Rouge, exist. Annexation is feasible; a
city can "sell itself" to the suburbs. Parish zoning should be au-
thorized in any event. By correlating their planning and zoning
parish and municipality could cover the ground effectively.
The general enabling act does not provide for slum clearance.
The subject could be dealt with by separate enactment but it is
intimately related to planning and zoning and, thus, it would
not be desirable to hedge the grant of power about with limita-
tions out of harmony with planning and zoning powers and pro-
cedures."
Continuance of Nonconforming Uses; Retroactive Zoning
Since zoning ordinances are drawn after vagaries in land uses
have already developed it is but just and proper that continuance
of existing nonconforming uses in restricted districts be per-
mitted. The pattern, of course, is to prevent extension or re-
newal of those uses so that ultimately they will leave the scene.
The immediate effect is to permit A to continue his existing use
but deny to B permission to begin 'a like use of his land in the
same district. That difference of treatment is not unconstitu-
tional discrimination.2 4  The Louisiana court has ruled that the
basis for such treatment, prevention of excessive hardship, is
broad enough to support the extension of a nonconforming use
as well as its bare continuance.5
The grant of zoning power is extensive enough to permit
retroactive zoning. Such drastic regulation has been upheld in
Louisiana. The City of New Orleans adopted a piecemeal zon-
ing ordinance in 1927, which created an exclusive residence zone
and allowed one year in which to liquidate business establish-
ments already in the zone. A real estate corporation, which
owned residential property in the district, sought and obtained,
after the year had elapsed, injunctions against the continuance
52. The police jury of Calcasieu Parish has tried its hand at airport
zoning without, so far as I am aware, benefit of enabling legislation. See
United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land in Calcasieu Parish, La., 55 F. Supp.
461 (W.D. La. 1944).
53. See the pertinent provisions of the Model City Charter (National
Municipal League, 1941) § 143 et seq.
54. Sampere v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 776, 117 So. 827 (1928); aff'd
279 U.S. 812, 49 S.Ct. 262, 73 L.Ed. 971 (1929).
55. State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927).
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of a grocery business" and a drug store57 on premises in the dis-
trict, which were near its properties. The Supreme Court relied
upon Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company58 in upholding
the measure. The burden of its reasoning was that if a munici-
pality has authority to create an exclusive residential district it
followed necessarily that authority would exist to remove any
business or trade from the district and to fix the limit of time for
removal. In the first of these cases a petition to the United States
Supreme Court for review by certiorari was denied.5 9 These
were hard cases. There was no comprehensive zoning ordinance
to guide the defendants to other locations safe from further
piecemeal measures. Even in comprehensive zoning sparing
resort to such drastic action as retroactive exclusion from a zone
is indicated.
In State ex rel. National Oil Works of Louisiana v. Mc-
Shane,60 the ordinance in question required that garages and fill-
ing stations within the zone be removed within a period of
roughly twelve months. The suit was one by a company, which
had long operated a filling station within the zone, to obtain a
mandamus requiring the issuance of a permit to remodel its
building so as to allow the construction of a drive-in filling sta-
tion. Certain property owners residing in the area intervened
and prayed for a permanent injunction against the operation of
the business on the ground that it was a nuisance in fact. The
court concluded that, on the evidence as to the continuous noise
made at the plaintiff's establishment, it was a nuisance in fact.
The court held that the intervenors were entitled to a perpetual
injunction against the operation of the business. It did not dis-
cuss the retroactive feature of the ordinance, but did declare that
the measure was not discriminatory and was a valid exercise of
the police power. It is significant, however, that the nuisance
element was enough to explain the result.
It appeared, in City of Shreveport v. Dickason,61 that Dicka-
son had in an earlier suit sought mandamus to compel the issu-
ance of a permit to build a filling station on her lot in a residence
zone. While that suit was pending, the city passed a zoning ordi-
nance which provided that nothing therein should be construed
56. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613
(1929).
57. State ex rel. Derna Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929).
58. 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
59. McDonald v. Louisiana ex rel. Dema Realty Co., 280 U.S. 556, 50 S.Ct.
16, 74 L.Ed. 612 (1929).
60. 159 La. 723, 106 So. 252 (1925).
61. 160 La. 563, 107 So. 427 (1926).
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as cancelling any permit theretofore granted or impairing the
rights of occupants and owners of existing business houses in
zoned areas. In that earlier case the ordinance zoning the area
in which Dickason's property was located was held invalid be-
cause of uncertainty in the description of the zoned area, and
the supreme court held that the property owner was entitled to a
building permit. Shortly after that decision the council passed an
ordinance forbidding the building inspector to issue permits for
the erection of any business building in a defined residence zone
which included the property in question. In this case the city
sought to have the construction of the building enjoined, but the
court held that since at the time the ordinance preserving any
outstanding permit was passed the property owner was entitled
to such a permit and was in the process of having her right to
the permit adjudicated, she was rightfully in the same class as
persons who actually had outstanding permits, and that it would
be a denial of equal protection of the laws to treat her now as in
a different class. Acting on this conclusion, the court granted
judgment for Dickason, as plaintiff in reconvention, extending
and continuing in force for a period of six months from the date
the judgment should become final, the permit issued to Dickason,
(apparently pursuant to the judgment in the earlier case; such
permit is not referred to elsewhere in this opinion), and en-
joining the city and its officers for such period from interfering
with the enjoyment of the permit. The six months provision in
this bit of "judicial legislation" was based upon the fact that un-
der the ordinances and building code of the city, building permits
were not revocable except for cause if construction was begun
within six months from the date of a permit.
In State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison,6" application had been
made for a building permit for a filling station prior to the adop-
tion of a zoning ordinance which placed the property in question
in a residence zone. The ordinance was given effect as to the
property in question despite the existence of the application for
a permit, and the Dickason case was distinguished by reference
to the judgment in the earlier case between the same parties,
upholding the right of the property owner to a permit, and to
the ordinance involved in that case which preserved permits
which had already been issued. Neither of those elements ex-
isted in the Manhein case."'
62. 164 La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927).
63. See also State ex rel. Sansone v. City of New Orleans, 163 La. 860, 113
So. 126 (1927); St. Bernard Oil Co. v. City of New Orleans, 165 La. 665, 115
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The Manhein decision was distinguished in the very recent
case of State ex rel. Fitzmaurice v. Clay.6 4 There the City of Ope-
lousas had, by resolution, held up action on applications for
building permits for construction of commercial buildings in an
area, proposed to be zoned for residence purposes, pending con-
sideration of and action on the proposal. This included an ap-
plication by X for a permit to build a gasoline filling station in
the area. He sought mandamus to compel its issuance. The zon-
ing proposal was referred to the zoning commission, which re-
ported on October 7, 1941. The next day X had judgment in the
district court for a peremptory writ of mandamus. The position
of the city was that action on X's application had merely been
deferred pending a final report of the zoning commission. But no
zoning ordinance had been adopted, nor, as a matter of fact, was
one ever enacted down to the time that the case was argued in
the supreme court in 1945. Thus, there was no police power
regulation to ground a denial of a permit. The supreme court
affirmed.
Necessity for Conformity with State Law
A zoning ordinance would necessarily give way in a case of
conflict with state law unless the enabling statute specially pro-
vided that the zoning ordinance should prevail. In the case of
Federal Land Bank v. John D. Nix, Enterpriser,65 the court recog-
nized that a building regulation ordinance would govern despite
an inconsistent statute where the enabling statute specifically so
provided. This decision was misconceived, however, in the court
of appeal case of Zeller v. La Nasa Bakery,66 in which the court
assumed that a zoning ordinance adopted under the 1926 act
might override a statute to the extent recognized in the Nix case.
The objection to this is that the matter can be determined only
by reference to the provisions of the enabling statute and to
those of the other statute if it be a later enactment; a zoning ordi-
nance would not override an existing statute unless it was so
provided in the enabling act. The 1926 act provides, in Section 9,
that wherever the regulations made under the authority of the
act require a greater width or size of side yards or other open
spaces, or require a lower height of buildings, and so on, or im-
So. 817 (1928); and State ex rel. Shaver v. Mayor and Councilmen of Town
of Coushatta, 196 So. 388 (La. App. 1940).
64. 208 La. 443, 23 So. (2d) 177 (1945).
65. 166 La. 566, 117 So. 720 (1928).
66. 172 So. 33 (La. App. 1937).
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pose other "higher standards" than are required in any other
statute or local ordinance or regulation, the provision of the regu-
lations made pursuant to that act shall govern. Where the regu-
lations prescribe a lower standard it is provided that the provi-
sions of such other statute or local ordinance or regulation shall
govern. It must be remembered, of course, that so far as the
municipality is concerned the legislature may by subsequent
enactment take away what it has given.
Certainty
Just like any other exertion of legislative power, a zoning
ordinance, to be effective, must be sufficiently certain to be rea-
sonably susceptible of application. Thus, in State ex rel. Dickla-
son v. Harris,7 a zoning ordinance, which prohibited business
buildings in "any recognized residential district" and contained
no description by streets or metes or bounds, was held invalid be-
cause of the uncertainty as to the bounds of the districts.
Legislative Procedure
The Standard Zoning Act requires, as a condition precedent
to exercising the powers conferred by the act, that a municipal
governing body appoint a zoning commission "to recommend the
boundaries of the various original districts and appropriate regu-
lations to be enforced therein." The commission must file a pre-
liminary report and hold public hearings on it before submitting
a final report to the governing body. Where a city planning
commission exists it may be constituted the zoning commission.
The Louisiana law tracks the Standard Act to this point, except
that it leaves no discretion about appointing an existing planning
commission to serve as the zoning commission. It significantly
fails, however, to complete the pattern by providing, as does the
Standard Act, that the governing body shall not hold its public
hearings or take action until it has received the final report of the
commission. 8 This represents a serious breakdown in compre-
hensive planning-zoning principles. It means that a city council
may ignore the zoning commission and proceed to zone, how-
ever ill-prepared it may be for the task. This should be cor-
rected by amendment. The omission, however, does not warrant
the conclusion that the publication of notice requirement ap-
plicable to a governing body hearing on a proposed zoning meas-
67. 158 La. 974, 105 So. 33 (1925).
68. Bassett, Williams, Bettman and Whitten, op. cit. supra note 10, at 33.
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ure applies as well to a zoning commission hearing on its pre-
liminary report. The hearing requirements are separate and the
publication provision relates, it seems clear, only to governing
body action. In a late case, however, the publication requirement
was deemed applicable to a zoning commission hearing. 9
The statutory requirements with respect to the adoption and
publication of zoning ordinances must, of course, be strictly com-
plied with. In State ex rel. Holcombe v. City of Lake Chlarles70
there was a serious want of compliance. There was no publica-
tion of notice of a hearing on the proposed ordinance and no
hearing was held. The ordinance was declared invalid.
The requirement that at least thirty days notice of the time
and place of public hearing be given by newspaper publication
is inadequate. In the case of original adoption of a comprehen-
sive zoning ordinance it doubtless should suffice to put the public
on notice merely to set out that purpose in the notice and to
state that access may be had to a copy of the proposed ordinance
at a designated place, such as the city clerk's office. But where
the proposed action is an amendment to a zoning ordinance
people living or owning property in the affected area are the ones
primarily concerned and the notice should be specific about the
area or areas affected. Moreover, more than one publication
should be made.71 The statute might, for example, be amended
to require publication once in each of two consecutive weeks,
first publication to be made at least fifteen days before the date
set for the hearing. It would be a simple matter to draft an
amendment to the statute to cover both these points.
In case of a sufficient protest against a proposed change in
zoning regulations a favorable vote of three-fifths of all the
members of the governing body is required for enactment. 2 It
is enough if the protest is signed by the owners of twenty per
centum or more in area of (a) the land included in the proposed
change or (b) the "area determined by lines drawn parallel to
and two hundred (200) feet distant from the boundaries of the
district proposed to be changed, . . ." Alternative "(b)" is ill-
conceived because it refers to a two-hundred foot strip entirely
around a district and applies even where only a slight change on
one side was contemplated. While the provision is but a mild
brake on municipal action, at best, the protest mechanism, if to
69. State ex rel. Fitzmaurice v. Clay, 208 La. 443, 23 So. (2d) 177 (1945).
70. 175 La. 803, 144 So. 502 (1932).
71. The likelihood that interested persons would see the notice would,
of course, be greatly enhanced.
72. La. Act 240 of 1926, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 57921.
1946]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
be continued, should be made available only to owners of prop-
erty immediately affected.
Apart from the requirement of notice and a public hearing,
the statute leaves to the governing body of a municipality the
task of providing for the manner in which zoning regulations
shall be adopted and modified.7 3 Since an ordinance regulating
procedure would be of no greater dignity than a zoning ordinance
the failure of the governing body itself to follow the prescribed
procedure is not likely to be considered an invalidating circum-
stance. Thus, in State ex rel. Pleasant v. Hardy7 4 it appeared
that Shreveport had first adopted a resolution and later an ordi-
nance fixing the procedure for applications to the governing body
for amendments to the city's general zoning ordinance. The fact
that such procedure had not been followed was not considered
significant because it was a creature of the governing body and
not a limitation upon the power of that body to amend the ordi-
nance.
The explanation of the Hardy decision is a bit too plausible.
Even though procedure for enactment has been determined by
the local governing body there is an important interest in con-
formity. Persons affected look to the established procedure. It
can be urged, moreover, that when the legislature expressly left
the subject in local hands the design was to achieve both local
discretion in the determination of procedure and the formula-
tion of rules which could be relied upon.
As a general proposition the courts will not enjoin legislative
action even on the local level. One who may be specially affected
can have his day in court after legislative discretion has been
exercised and policy articulated in a definite measure. This
principle has been applied by the Court of Appeal of Louisiana
for the Second Circuit in denying injunctive relief with respect
to a proposed amendment to a zoning ordinance.75 More recently,
the supreme court has laid it down plainly that an injunction
may be obtained against the adoption of a municipal ordinance
only where the ordinance would be in direct violation of a pro-
hibitory law.
76
Administrative Procedure; Review
The zoning enabling act authorizes a municipality to estab-
lish a board of adjustment to perform the functions of a typical
73. La. Act 240 of 1926, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5791].
74. 157 So. 130 (La. App. 1934).
75. State ex rel. Pleasant v. Hardy, 157 So. 130 (La. App. 1934).
76. Durrett Hardware & Furniture Co., Inc. v. City of Monroe, 199 La.
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zoning board of appeals. 7  The exercise of this authority is op-
tional. Instead of exercising it a municipal governing body may
undertake to perform zoning administrative functions directly.
In the larger communities, at least, there is likely to be a consid-
erable volume of work of this character, which strongly bespeaks
the need of an independent board to perform it.
In at least two instances the Louisiana Supreme Court has
been confronted with zoning ordinances which provided for the
allowing of nonconforming uses in restricted zones by special
permission of the governing bodies but did not articulate any
standard to govern the exercise of their discretion. In each case
the ordinance was declared unconstitutional on the ground that
it vested an arbitrary administrative discretion in the governing
body the adverse exercise of which amounted to denial of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.78
Such difficulties could readily be obviated. The court is not
very exacting in its application of the requirement that there be
a governing standard. A zoning ordinance which empowered
the governing body to authorize a temporary building for com-
merce or industry incidental to the residential development in
a residence zone has been upheld.7 9
A board of adjustment is a five-man body organized along
judicial lines. It is granted ancillary powers appropriate to the
conduct of its business. An appeal may be taken to the board
from a decision of an administrative officer by any person ag-
grieved or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the
municipality. An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of
the action appealed from, except that if the administrative officer
certifies that, in his opinion, a stay would cause imminent peril
of life or property, proceedings may be stayed only by restrain-
ing order of the board or a court of record on due cause shown.
The powers of such a board are:
"1. To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is
error in any order, requirement, decisions, or determination
made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this
act or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto.
329, 5 So. (2d) 911, 140 A.L.R. 433 (1942), noted in (1942) 16 Tulane L. Rev.
632.
77. La. Act 240 of 1926, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5794].
78. Bultman Mortuary Service, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 174 La. 360,
140 So. 503 (1932); State ex rel. Dickson v. Harrison, 161 La. 218, 108 So. 421
(1926).
79. State ex rel. Manhein v. Harrison, 164 La. 564, 114 So. 159 (1927).
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"2. To hear and decide all matters referred to it or upon
which it is required to pass under such ordinance.
"3. In passing upon appeals, where there are practical
difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying
out the strict letter of such ordinance, to vary or modify the
application of any of the regulations or provisions of such
ordinance relating to the use, construction or alteration of
buildings or structures or the use of land so that the spirit
of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare
secured and substantial justice done."' 0
The second item, unlike the corresponding item of the Stand-
ard Act, is not limited to action on special exceptions to a zon-
ing ordinance. Its content is left to the discretion of the munici-
pal governing body.
In acting on an appeal a board may reverse or modify the
action appealed from and may take such action as ought to be
taken. For that purpose it is endowed with all the powers of
the officer whose action is under review. A four-fifths vote is
required to reverse the action of an administrative officer, to rule
for the applicant on any matter upon which it is required to pass
under a zoning ordinance, or to effect any variation in the ordi-
nance.
A board decision is subject to district court review by certio-
rari with respect to its "legality." If, upon the hearing, the court
considers testimony necessary it may take it or appoint a referee
to take testimony and report his findings of fact and conclusions
of law for consideration by the court as a part of the record. The
court may reverse, affirm or modify the decision below.
Once a governing body has put the board of adjustment ma-
chinery in operation parties affected should be deemed bound
to employ it in all matters within its field of operation. An ag-
grieved property owner would, thus, have to exhaust his right
of recourse to the board before he could seek judicial relief.8 1
Even more, he should be held to the method of judicial review
provided unless it were shown to be clearly inadequate. In the
case of State ex rel. Kreher v. Quinlan,8 2 it appeared that X and Y
owned properties across from each other on a street in a class B
residence zone in which the erection of a storage garage was for-
80. La. Act 240 of 1926, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5794].
81. This is in keeping with the well-established principle that one must
first exhaust administrative remedies. See Berger, Exhaustion of Adminis-
trative Remedies (1939) 48 Yale L. J. 981.
82. 182 La. 721, 162 So. 577 (1935).
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bidden. X already had a garage on his property and the city
engineer refused a permit to Y to build one on his; but the board
of adjustment, on appeal, reversed the engineer's ruling and di-
rected the issuance of the permit. X applied for a rehearing be-
fore the board in opposition to the issuance of the permit but his
application was denied. X then brought this suit for mandamus
to compel the board and the city engineer to revoke and set aside
the permit granted to Y. A judgment denying the writ was af-
firmed on two grounds: (1) the discretion of the board of adjust-
ment with respect to the granting of the permit cannot be con-
trolled by mandamus, and (2) the remedy of certiorari provided
by the statute was appropriate and adequate.
There has been no adjudication of the validity of that provi-
sion of the 1926 act empowering a zoning board of adjustment to
vary or modify the application of a zoning ordinance in cases of
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships "so that the spirit
of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare
secured and substantial justice done." The question is whether
the delegation of power is sufficiently narrowed by a governing
standard. While it is considered that the Standard Act is more
effectively worded to this end, I have little doubt but that the
provision would withstand attack in the courts. The situation is
not unlike that of numerous federal administrative bodies which
employ judicial methods in applying very broad legislative stand-
ards.83
A zoning board of adjustment is so thoroughly judicial in char-
acter that it has been deemed to have no standing to appeal from
a decision of a district court in a case in which that court was
reviewing board action.84 The thought, in brief, is that a judge
is not a party to a case he is hearing. The statute provides that
costs, in the district court, shall not be allowed against a board
unless it shall appear to the court that the board had acted with
malice, gross negligence or bad faith. Were costs assessed to a
board, that would create a pecuniary interest in the matter and
give rise to the question whether there might be an appeal as
to costs alone, apart from the merits of the case.
83. The Federal Communication Commission is a fair example. Federal
Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond and Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,
53 S.Ct. 627, 77 L.Ed. 1166 (1933).
84. State ex rel. Bringhurst v. Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment,
198 La. 758, 4 So. (2d) 820 (1941); State ex rel. Hurley v. Zoning Board of
Appeal and Adjustment, 198 La. 766, 4 So. (2d) 822 (1941).
Contra: Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 15 A. (2d) 6 (1940). The Con-
necticut court forcefully developed the point that the board represents the
public interest.
1946]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Sanctions
(1) Punitive. The zoning enabling act makes violation of a
municipal zoning regulation a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine
of from ten to twenty-five dollars "nor more than thirty days'
jail sentence" for each day the violation continues. This provi-
sion is ambiguous as to whether there may be sentence of either
fine or imprisonment or both.85 It should be clarified by amend-
ment.
(2) Civil. Even before the zoning enabling law was enacted
the supreme court recognized the standing of a municipality to
obtain an injunction to restrain the continuance of a prohibited
nonconforming use. New Orleans had the operation of a retail
ladies wearing apparel store in a residence area enjoined.80 The
suit was deemed in effect one to abate a nuisance since, in the
view of the court, the outlawing of the nonconforming use made
it a nuisance-if for no other reason because it was in defiance
of the municipal government.
Under Section 8 of the zoning enabling act a municipality is
authorized to institute any appropriate action to prevent an un-
lawful erection or use in violation of a zoning ordinance. This
would include resort to injunctive relief.
A nice question arises as to the standing to sue of another
property owner, whose property is devoted to a conforming use.
If the continuance of a prohibited nonconforming use constitutes
a public nuisance, it would seem to follow that it would be a
private nuisance as to any property owner specially damaged.
The decisions bear out this reasoning. 7
In a recent case arising in New Orleans commerce won a re-
sounding victory over the fireside. The comprehensive zoning
ordinance so divided a certain block that a nice corner residence
property and the vacant lot adjoining were in an apartment dis-
trict, from which business establishments such as restaurants
were excluded, and the restaurant just beyond the lot was in a
85. The defendant in City of New Orleans v. Estrade, 200 La. 552, 8 So.
(2d) 536 (1942), was sentenced to pay a fine of $10, or in default thereof, to
serve thirty days in the parish prison. The conviction was annulled on the
merits by the supreme court. Defendant had two illuminated horseshoe
pitching courts in his side yard, which were used nearly every evening. His
home was in a residential district. The court would not accept the con-
tention that the use was non-residential and thus violative of the provi-
sions of the city's zoning ordinance.
86. City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, Limited, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798,
40 A.L.R. 1136 (1924).
87. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 614 (1929);
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 618 (1929).
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commercial district. X owned both the lot and the restaurant
building. The lot was used as a parking area for patrons of the
restaurant, which, incidentally, was open all night. The zoning
ordinance defined "garage" to mean a building or any lot used
for, among other things, parking self-propelled vehicles. The
owner and occupant of the residence obtained a sweeping pre-
liminary injunction against the use of the lot for parking pur-
poses. The supreme court dissolved the injunction.88  The court
rejected both the contention that the use of the lot was an exten-
sion of the restaurant business to it and the argument that the
use for parking was within the definition of "garage." Great
stress was laid upon the refusal of the municipal authorities to
prosecute and their apparent interpretation of the ordinance fa-
vorably to the use complained of. I do not find this reasoning
very compelling. I would be more interested in a studied opinion
of the city attorney than in mere failure to prosecute. The actual
use of the lot was patently commercial. That use, moreover, was
incident to the restaurant business. Again, the lot was being
used for parking as a profit venture; that no separate charge was
made does not obscure the profit nature of the use.
Airport Zoning
It is necessary to control, in some wise, the heights of struc-
tures and trees in the area surrounding an airport if conditions
requisite to safe flying operations are to be assured. Of various
possible methods of control,8 9 airport zoning has grown rapidly
in popularity." This is a particularly attractive method to the
air lines for the practical reason that it is not costly to them.
Over thirty states, including Louisiana, have adopted airport zon-
ing legislation in one form or another.8 1
The Louisiana enabling law is Act 118 of 1944.02 It is based
88. State ex rel. Szodomka v. Gruber, 201 La. 1068, 10 So. (2d) 899 (1942).
89. "Ten possible ways of controlling the height of structures or trees
which interfere with the use of airports have been suggested. These are:
(1) Voluntary action by owners of property adjoining or near the airport,
(2) Purchase of all land near the airport, (3) Purchase of air space rights
over the land near the airport, (4) Acquisition of the land near the airport
by use of the power of eminent domain, (5) Acquisition of air space rights
over the land near the airport by use of the power of eminent domain, (6)
Police power condemnation of hazards dangerous to those using the airport,
(7) Zoning regulations, (8) Use of Commerce power by the Federal Govern-
ment, (9) Use of War power by the Federal Government, and (10) Use of
the postal by the Federal Government." Rhyne, Airports and the Courts
(1944) 165.
90. Concerning federal airport zoning see Smylie, Constitutionality of
Federal Airport Zoning (1943) 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1.
91. Rhyne, op. cit. supra note 89, at 171.
92. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 27.40 et seq.
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upon the model act sponsored by the Civil Aeronautics Admin-
istration and the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers.13
The model act was but imperfectly adapted to conform to Louis-
iana's situation. One finds, for example, that counties and bor-
oughs, in addition to parishes, cities, towns and villages, are
granted airport zoning authority!
Zoning authority under the act comprehends regulation of
(a) land uses and (b) height of structures and trees. Such reg-
ulation may be fitted into a general pattern of comprehensive
zoning. Retroactive airport zoning is expressly forbidden, 94 but
a system of permit-issuance is authorized under which conform-
ity may be exacted with respect to nonconforming structures
which have been abandoned or more than eighty per centum torn
down, destroyed or deteriorated and to trees which have been
"abandoned" or are over eighty per centum decayed.9 5
Any parish or municipality may adopt airport zoning regu-
lations for "any airport within its jurisdiction." Likewise, the
parish or municipality which owns an airport may zone to pro-
tect its approaches, whether located within or wholly or partly
outside its limits. In case of conflict the regulations of the pro-
prietor unit govern." Beyond the general concept of "approach-
protection" the act affords little guidance as to the physical scope
of airport zoning. A definite geographical pattern could not ef-
fectively be made by statute. The act provides for adminis-
trative review by a board of appeals,9 7 along the same lines as
that set out in the Standard Zoning Enabling Act. The jurisdic-
tion of such a board, however, would not extend to the case of
a landowner who contended that his property was not properly
included in the area zoned. He would have standing to attack
the ordinance immediately by any judicial proceeding appropri-
ate to his situation, such as mandamus to compel issuance of a
building permit, without first running the administrative gamut. 8
93. The model act stems from a draft published in 1939. See Rhyne,
loc. cit. supra note 91. Since then it has undergone several revisions. See
Municipalities and the Law in Action (National Institute of Municipal Law
OIlcers-1945 ed.) 259.
94. La. Act 118 of 1944, § 5(4) [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 2744(4)].
Louisiana left out the provision of the model act which precludes applica-
tion of the zoning restrictions to existing trees.
95. La. Act 118 of 1944, § 6 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 27.45].
96. La. Act 118 of 1944, § 5(3) [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 27.44(3)].
97. La. Act 118 of 1944, § 7(3) [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 27.46(3)].
If the local unit already has a zoning board of adjustment or appeals it
may be appointed as the board of appeals under this act.
98. The situation is comparable to that where the inclusion of par-
ticular land in a restricted zone is open to attack as arbitrary and not con-
ducive to police power objectives. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928).
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A significant feature is the grant of authority for joint zon-
ing.99 The parish in which a municipal airport is situated and
the proprietor municipality may jointly zone to protect the aerial
approaches to the airport. The actual zoning is done by a joint
board, composed of two members from each participating unit,
appointed by its chief executive officer.
The constitutionality of airport zoning, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, has not been established. With respect to land situ-
ated quite close to an airport proper and in an approach lane,
height regulation will, of course, be most drastic and constitu-
tionality most in doubt. The problem thins out as to property
in the more distant reaches of the zoned area. Airport zoning
does not fit neatly into the conception of comprehensive zoning
as an arrangement interacting to the advantage of owners in the
various zones by fostering appropriate development in accord-
ance with a coherent general plan. It simply restricts' develop-
ment in the zoned area for the benefit of air navigation and com-
merce. The reciprocal advantage is the general benefit to the
community of the facility and such favorable economic effect
upon property uses and values as propinquity to an airport may
involve.10 0
An inferior court in New Jersey has declared a Newark air-
port zoning ordinance unconstitutional as a taking of private
property without due process of law.'0 The court rested one foot
on lack of statutory authority for such zoning. That would have
been enough as an independent ground of decision. The other
foot, however, was planted firmly on the constitutional objection.
An overzealous advocate of airport zoning has found in a
federal district court case, which arose in Louisiana, support for
the validity of airport zoning.' The United States was condemn-
ing avigation rights with respect to the airspace over land of
certain owners, situated near the Lake Charles Army Air Field.'0 3
The police jury of the parish had previously adopted an ordi-
nance fixing a building height limit of twenty-five feet in an
area including the property in suit. There is no indication that
any question was raised as to the validity of the ordinance. A
verdict of "no dollars" as to the value of the rights was sustained
99. La. Act 118 of 1944, § 5(2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 27.44(2)].
100. The subject Is discussed is Comment (1944) 23 Tex. L. Rev. 56.
101. Yara Engineering Corporation v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370,
40 A. (2d) 559 (1945); Rice v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A. (2d) 561
(1945).
102. Rhyne, op. cit. supra note 89, at 187.
103. United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land in Calcasieu Parish, La., 55 F.
Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1944).
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by denial of a motion for a new trial. Judge Dawkins expressed
the view that, in view of the ordinance, and the location and
probable use of the land, no appreciable diminution in value was
effected by the taking. Thus, while the judgment might be res
adjudicata, as between the parties, with respect to questions of
validity, on the theory that they could have been raised,10 the
case is obviously of no significance as a precedent.
The statute is fortified, however, by a provision authorizing
expropriation where the "necessary approach protection cannot,
because of constitutional limitations, be provided by airport zon-
ing regulations under this act.",10  Such frank recognition of the
problem is commendable. It provides, moreover, an effective al-
ternative method of proceeding.
CONCLUSION
It has been my purpose, in this paper, to present an appraisal
of the legal materials of planning and zoning in Louisiana. A
number of critical observations have been made. If any one or
more of them have merit, there is yet time to give them legis-
lative formulation with a view to consideration by the legislature
at the coming regular session.
104i Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940).
105. La. Act 118 of 1944, § 10 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1944) § 27.49].
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